WHICH INDICATORS ARE MOST USEFUL FOR COMPARING CITIZENSHIP POLICIES?
Which indicators are most useful for comparing citizenship policies?

Edited by Rainer Bauböck and Marc Helbling
Abstract
The comparative study of citizenship regimes has reached a new stage. Several authors and research teams have constructed indicators and compound indices that allow comparing larger numbers of countries in more systematic ways. In his kickoff contribution for the EUDO CITIZENSHIP forum debate, Marc Helbling asks whether indicators that are constructed independently from each other, but often measure similar phenomena, are really useful. He suggests to distinguish between policy outputs and outcomes, naturalisation and rejection rates as well as simple and complex indicators. Nine authors respond to this challenge. Several among them propose that citizenship indicators serve different research purposes and some challenge the very idea of indicator-based evaluation of citizenship policies. Although this debate certainly does not concluded in consensus, Helbling’s rejoinder shows that the link between research purposes and methods has been clarified to a certain extent. By social science standards, this is not insignificant progress.

Keywords
Comparative citizenship analysis, citizenship indicators, policy outputs and outcomes, naturalisation rates
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Which indicators are most useful for comparing citizenship policies?

Marc Helbling*

Over the last decade there has been an important new development in the citizenship literature. After a long period of case study research and small-N comparisons, various scholars and projects have started to compare a relatively large range of cases (Waldrauch and Hofinger 1997; Koopmans et al. 2005, 2010; MPG 2006; Helbling 2008; Howard 2009; Janoski 2010). This new research approach has inevitably led to a quantification of the data under study, however, not yet to the creation of a widely accepted citizenship indicator. On the contrary, there are almost as many indices as there are large-N studies.

The emerging pioneer spirit has left surprisingly little space to the question of how useful these indicators are to compare citizenship policies. Do we need so many indicators? Do they all measure the same or different concepts? Do they really measure what they are supposed to measure? While hardly anybody will disagree that we need a more thorough discussion on these questions, it is all the more astonishing that such a debate has been absent so far.

Besides the more general claim that we urgently need such a debate, I like to make three further points in this contribution: (1) There is evidence that most of the existing indicators measure the same concepts, irrespective of how sophisticated the indicators are. It would therefore be more efficient to stick to simple indicators and avoid projects that require a huge amount of resources for the data collection. (2) Moreover, while some indicators combine information on policy aspects with naturalisation rates, keeping apart these two aspects would allow us to make a difference between the output and the outcome of citizenship politics. Isolating policy outcomes is particularly important to study policy effects. (3) While policy outcome studies most often use naturalisation rates and define these as the ratio between the yearly number of naturalisations and the number of foreign residents in a country, I claim that we should focus on rejection rates, i.e. the ratio between the rejected and the submitted applications as a more valid way to study policy effects.

Let us first see whether all indicators that focus on policy aspects measure the same concept (Waldrauch and Hofinger 1997; Koopmans et al. 2005, 2010; MPG 2006; Howard 2009). Both Howard (2009: 32-35) and Koopmans et al. (2010: 12-13) use correlation tests to compare their own indicators with each other and in addition make a comparison with the Migration Integration Policy Indices (MIPEX) (MPG 2006). Koopmans et al. additionally compare their indicator with the Legal Obstacles to Integration-Index (LOI, Waldrauch and Hofinger 1997). Since all but Howard’s indicator also include information on integration regulations, only the components that are directly related to naturalisation regulations are accounted for in the two tests. By doing so, Howard (2009) and Koopmans et al. (2010) run reliability tests and assess the consistency of their codings. Although they run slightly different correlation tests, both come to the conclusion that all indicators are highly related to each other and thus seem to measure the same concept in a consistent way.

In addition to these authors’ calculations, I have run correlation and factor analysis tests of the overall indicators including all components and thus have analysed their convergent validity. I found that even if additional aspects concerning integration are included the four indices correlate at a relatively high level between 0.7 and 0.9 and load highly on the same factor. Such a finding is all the more astonishing as the four studies created their indicators in different ways that required different amounts of resources. Howard’s Citizenship Policy Indicator (CPI), which is based on data from the

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NATAC project (The Acquisition of Nationality in EU Member States: Rules, Practices and Quantitative Developments) and integrates three elements (ius soli, naturalisation requirements, dual citizenship), is certainly the most straightforward indicator as it is based on information that is clearly specified in national laws.

Wal drauch and Hofinger (1997) included almost 80 items in their index. Koopmans et al.’s (2005; 2010) 42 sub-indicators do not only involve legal but also cultural aspects that depend on jurisprudence, administrative decrees and local implementation practices – information that is more difficult to find and code. Finally, the MIPEX-indicator, which is based on a large range of over 100 sub-indicators, relies on an attempt to measure policies in the realm of immigrant integration against a standard of “best practice” drawn from Council of Europe Conventions or European Community Directives. Data are collected by means of expert surveys in which the respective national legislations are evaluated.

In the light of such findings one might wonder why we do not simply stick to indicators that require relatively few resources to be built. More generally, we also need to ask why so many resources are invested in large projects, such as the EUDO citizenship project. What is the added value of such a project? Would it not be better to heavily reduce the number of items that are covered in such a project and instead collect data over time and for countries outside the Western world? Such questions not only concern naturalisation, but also other domains, such as the research projects that measure policy positions of political parties. Various studies have shown that different methods based on newspaper and party manifesto codings as well as expert and population surveys lead to similar results (Marks et al. 2007; Ray 2007; Helbling and Tresch 2010).

A second problem in the current citizenship literature concerns the confusion between policy outputs and outcomes. Whereas one group of researchers focuses on citizenship policies (Wal drauch and Hofinger 1997; Koopmans et al. 2005; 2010; MPG 2006; Howard 2009), another group seeks to explain the number of people affected by such policies (i.e. naturalisation or rejection rates) (Helbling 2008; Janoski 2010). This differentiation is, however, seldom made explicit, and it is often not clear why one indicator is preferred over another one and whether or not they are used to answer the same research questions.

The latter question can be illustrated by a construct validity test that “assesses whether a measure relates to other observed variables in a way that is consistent with theoretically derived predictions” (Bollen 1989: 188). In this short test, I compare the three studies by Helbling (2008), Howard (2009) and Janoski (2010) that have developed a very similar theoretical framework (see also Koopmans et al. 2010: 25). All three focus on the politics of citizenship and show that political parties and their mobilisation play an important role; they do so, however, to explain, at least at first sight, three different aspects, namely rejection rates, citizenship policies and naturalisation rates.

In my own study, I argue that local political struggles lead to specific national self-understandings within a municipality, which in turn explains to a high degree local rejection rates (Helbling 2008). This argument is supported by both a large-N study including 103 municipalities and a comparison of 14 case studies. Howard (2009) asks whether widely existing anti-immigrant sentiments become activated politically by the far right, which in turn might dampen liberalisation processes. In his comparison of 15 countries and their development between 1980 and 2008 he finds indeed a quite strong relationship between the strength of far right parties and citizenship liberalisation. Janoski (2010) compares 18 countries and their evolution between 1970 and 2006. He reveals that increasing left party power in the post-World War II period leads to higher naturalisation rates. While all three studies find evidence for their main argument, they show at the same time that socio-structural and socio-economic factors such as immigration and unemployment rates fail to explain the respective dependent variables.
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Not only is it often unclear why output or outcome variables are put forward. It even happens sometimes that the two aspects are combined. Both Howard (2009) and Koopmans et al. (2005; 2010) use naturalisation rates as part of their policy indicators. Howard (2009: 24) uses naturalisation rates as a “correction” that helps him “to account for the potential problem of a country appearing to have a very inclusive naturalisation policy, but in reality – whether due to administrative “discretion” or other barriers or disincentives – being much more restrictive in practice.” For exactly the same reason, Koopmans et al. (2005: 38) have included naturalisation rates in their indicator. They argue that there are many informal factors that might affect access of migrants to the nationality of the host country. By including naturalisation rates both studies are at the same time pointing to and blurring the crucial differentiation between policy outputs and outcomes. It thus becomes once more unclear what these indicators are actually measuring.

To measure the outcome of citizenship politics, naturalisation rates are most useful. The same argument holds in other domains such as for example immigration politics. Money (1999) relied on immigration ratios and not on the policies themselves to study immigration politics in her large-N study. She argues that looking exclusively at the formal regulations leaves out important aspects such as the control, interpretation and implementation of laws as well as the consequences of formal regulations that are in this case the actual numbers of admitted immigrants (Money 1999: 22).

Besides the classic naturalisation rates that measure the ratio between the yearly number of naturalisations and the number of foreign residents in a country, there are alternative ways to evaluate policy effects that might be more valid. Janoski (2010) proposes a new and, as he claims, a more comprehensive way of measuring naturalisation rates. Instead of just looking at the number of people who have passed the official naturalisation procedures, he also accounts for different naturalisation regimes, some of which allow some people to "circumvent" the naturalisation processes. For example, in countries with a ius soli policy citizenship is automatically conferred to children of resident immigrants. Janoski considers this as an alternative form of naturalisation and accordingly adjusts his indicator by adding up the number of naturalised people and the number of people who receive the nationality at birth.

Although Janoski accounts for important additional aspects of policy effects, I claim that it is better to use rejection rates. In the same paragraph where Howard (2009: 24) explains why he takes into account naturalisation rates he states that they “should not be relied on too closely, since the rates may depend significantly on the provenance of the immigration population, as well as the demographic patterns of immigration […].” Howard points here to the crucial content validity problem of naturalisation rates that depend on both the demand and the supply side. After all, a low naturalisation rate might be explained by a restrictive naturalisation policy, and/or by the fact that there is low demand on the part of the foreign population. Moreover, since the ratio is measured within the overall foreign-resident population, changes of the naturalisation rate might tell us more about immigration flows (the denominator in the calculation) than about the desire of foreign residents to become naturalised (Ludvig 2004: 509-510).

We need, however, an indicator that depends on the supply side only, since the reasons why somebody applies for citizenship are not relevant for explaining the conditions for doing so. Indeed, we would rather like to know why citizenship policy is more restrictive in some settings than in others. For these reasons I propose to use rejection rates, that is, the ratio between the rejected and the submitted applications (Helbling 2008). In contrast with the naturalisation rate, the rejection rate almost exclusively depends on the supply side. Once the applications are handed in, naturalisation candidates no longer have control over them; whether they are rejected or not depends entirely on legal regulations and administrative authorities. While the validity of this indicator is much better for measuring policy effects, it is not perfect for two key reasons. The rejection rate does not consider, first, that certain candidates withdraw their applications during the procedure and, second, that some
alien residents might not apply because they do not expect to be naturalised in settings with a restrictive naturalisation policy (deterrence effects).

I conclude with the paradoxical diagnosis that existing citizenship indicators seem to measure the same theoretical concept but that it is unclear what this concept is. According to the convergent and construct validity tests, all indicators measure pretty much the same thing. They correlate with each other at a relatively high level and can be explained by the same factors. There are, however, a lot of conceptual inconsistencies and the various scholars seldom specify what they really seek to explain. For a young research field this is not uncommon as one important step at such a stage is to bring together different ideas and approaches before a generally accepted measure of a certain concept emerges.

Nonetheless, every project needs to specify what exactly is under study. Otherwise it is almost impossible to build on existing work and to advance knowledge. Moreover, such clarifications are also necessary to make research more efficient. If it is really the case that the existing indicators measure the same concept, then one might wonder why we should use indicators whose coding is rather time-consuming instead of just taking already available data on the number of naturalised immigrants or even better on the ratio of rejected applications.

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We need different indicators for different research questions

David Reichel *

Marc Helbling’s kick-off statement questioning the usefulness of indicators which aim at measuring differences in citizenship policies as well as its outcomes and outputs raises several issues. In my response to Marc Helbling, I will focus on the usefulness of naturalisation rates as a measure of citizenship policy outcomes as well as on alternative indicators such as rejection rates and duration until naturalisation.

First, Marc Helbling criticises the conflation of policy outputs and outcomes. This very good point raises the question of how the relationship between policy outputs and outcomes can be measured. A general brief comparison of citizenship policy outputs in the form of the MIPEX (2006) and the policy outcomes in the form of the average naturalisation rates in the EU-15 between 2002 and 2007 shows no or only a weak relationship between those two indicators (see Figure 1).

Figure 1:
Comparison of citizenship policy outputs (MIPEX 2006) and outcomes (naturalisation rates).

Sources: Own calculations based on MIPEX – Access to nationality 2007 and data from Eurostat.

Leaving out Sweden would lead to the result that there is no significant correlation left between the two variables. However, theoretically, a correlation between policy outputs and outcomes has to be assumed, as otherwise citizenship polices would not have an effect on citizenship acquisitions. Thus, this simple comparison of policy outputs and outcomes indicates that naturalisation rates are insufficient to explain policy outcomes and hence supports Marc Helbling’s argument about the

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1 I would like to thank Albert Kraler for helpful comments.

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weakness of naturalisation rates as a measure for citizenship policy outcomes. This weakness, however, applies to the use of ‘simple naturalisation rates’ only, defined as the share of acquisitions of citizenship in a given year in the total foreign population at the beginning of each year. The main weakness of traditional naturalisation rates is that they cannot easily be interpreted as a probability of being naturalised. To do so, it would be necessary to base the rate on the foreign population actually eligible for naturalisation, or as statisticians call it, the population at risk of experiencing an event. As pointed out by Nicolas Perrin (2006) a cohort approach towards measuring rates of citizenship acquisition would allow the calculation of the likelihood of obtaining citizenship for individual cohorts of immigrants which would provide a much better measure of the impact of policy measures on patterns of citizenship acquisition. However, the calculation and use of such naturalisation rates is severely limited by the lack of availability of appropriate data (for this individual longitudinal data need to be generated or at least the year of immigration of all persons acquiring citizenship should be available). Nevertheless, as an increasing number of countries are moving towards register-based statistical data collection systems which in principle allow extracting longitudinal data, more such data are likely to be available in the future. Secondly, most naturalisation rates do not include naturalisations only but all sort of acquisitions of citizenship including automatic forms of citizenship acquisition. With data from seven Western European countries for the years from 1991 to 1997 Bisogno and Gallo show that by using the ‘narrow’ definition of citizenship acquisition (naturalisation) the citizenship policy can be captured much better than by employing general rates (Bisogno & Gallo unpublished).

Nevertheless, general naturalisation rates remain of value as a general demographic indicator for the population acquiring citizenship of the country of residence and – given relatively constant immigration – they can also reflect the impact of citizenship policies3 (though naturalisations can be explained by a large set of factors also including the policy in the country of origin as well as the individuals’ characteristics such as the socio-economic status or future plans).

Secondly, Marc Helbling proposes rejection rates as an alternative indicator. I agree that such an indicator could serve as valuable additional information for explaining citizenship policies and as it is a measure of administrative practice could also generate interesting insights into local or regional variations within a particular country. Nonetheless, rejection rates face their difficulties as well. Firstly, the calculation of exact rejection rates might be difficult since most countries will provide only information on the annual (or quarterly) number of applications and rejections. Consequently the number of rejections does not necessarily correspond to the applications of the same year (the same problem applies to the calculation of recognition rates of asylum seekers). This problem can be overcome by using rejections as a share of the total number of decisions in a certain time period. Yet, again the availability of longitudinal data would be of peculiar value and allow for analysing rejection rates for certain immigrant cohorts. Furthermore, as alluded by Marc Helbling, rejection rates do not cover persons who do not apply for citizenship, including persons who would like to obtain the citizenship of their country of residence but who expect a low chance in succeeding in their application (it can be assumed that persons request detailed information prior to applying for citizenship, in particular given the high costs citizenship acquisition might entail in some countries). The second drawback mentioned by Marc Helbling, withdrawn or discontinued applications, also significantly hampers the value of rejection rates, since persons might discontinue their application because of the fear of rejection or due to the high costs accruing during the application procedure (e.g. translation of documents).

Finally, I would like to propose another indicator which could serve as a measure of citizenship policy outcomes. In my doctoral thesis (Reichel forthcoming) I calculated the time until naturalisation

3 For instance, the naturalisation rates in Austria dropped significantly after tightening the regulations in 2006 and again in 2009.
of all persons having naturalised in Austria (and who were still living in Austria in 2008). By differentiating the average length of residence until naturalisation by time periods of different citizenship regulations in force I found significant differences in the average length of residence until naturalisation (with longer average durations in the most recent time periods). This result strongly indicates that restricting the conditions for acquiring citizenship led to a much longer average duration until obtaining Austrian citizenship. This result held true even after controlling for several other factors such as education, country of origin, federal district (Vienna or other), age and sex. Although, the use of this indicator for international comparisons would again lead to the conflation of citizenship policy outputs and outcomes, as it is strongly influenced by the required length of residence for naturalisation, it also reflects administrative practices and naturalisation realities of immigrants and their descendents.

In summary, I would like to reason that several indicators are needed for measuring the outcomes of citizenship policies including naturalisation rates, rejection rates as well as the time between immigration (or birth) and naturalisation. The use of these indicators, however, depends on the research question to be answered and the data availability.

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Naturalisation rates and rejection rates measure different phenomena, and have different problems

Maarten Vink

In his stimulating kick-off contribution for a debate on citizenship policy indicators and concept measurement Marc Helbling makes three central claims: (1) simple indicators are better (‘more efficient’) than more sophisticated indicators that require a ‘huge amount’ of resources for data collection; (2) policy output indicators should not include policy outcome indicators; (3) rejection rates are a better indicator of citizenship policy outcomes than naturalisation rates.

In this comment on Helbling’s welcome methodological contribution I respond to his second and, mainly, third claims. Helbling’s first claim seems to be about a point that is rather separate from his second and third claims dealing with naturalisation rates. I find it difficult to see the principal message that Helbling aims to defend here. With regard to Helbling’s question about the added value of large-scale data collection projects, such as EUDO CITIZENSHIP, I am not sure how that relates to his observation that there is much correlation between the several policy indices that he discusses. EUDO CITIZENSHIP, after all, explicitly does not aim at collecting data for the sake of developing a citizenship policy index. Instead, it is a project that is driven by the wish to collect precise and comprehensive information about citizenship laws in 33 European countries, without summarising such information in the form of a policy index. Hence, the EUDO CITIZENSHIP databases on modes of acquisition and modes of loss of citizenship contain precisely that: a precise description of citizenship laws in terms of a rigid comparative typology. Citizenship indices only make sense when they focus on a specific question, such as ease of access to citizenship for immigrants, which does not capture the multiple purposes of citizenship legislation. EUDO CITIZENSHIP aims at making citizenship laws comparable with regard to many other aspects, such as the inclusion of extraterritorial populations as citizens or the loss of citizenship, which cannot be combined with the inclusion of immigrants into a single indicator. There is much more to say about the construction of policy indices, and the comparability of existing indices, but I leave that discussion aside for now.

With regard to Helbling’s second claim, I could not agree more. Policy output indicators, such as policy indices, should indeed not include policy outcome indicators, such as naturalisation rates, because that invalidates the goal of measuring the effects (outcome) of policies (output). Obviously, when looking at citizenship policies and naturalisation rates, these may not correlate in a way as one might naively think they would. Austria is a good example of a country that typically scores low on citizenship policy indices (see e.g. MIPEX) but that has higher than expected naturalisation rates (although declining during recent years). This may have to do with a relatively high demand for Austrian citizenship. It may also have to do with a high degree of legal certainty and procedural clarity: even though material conditions (eligibility) are tough, procedural conditions may be relatively better. Alternatively, high(er) naturalisation rates, as in Portugal since 2006, may be caused by an active government putting citizenship acquisition high on the agenda. One may come up with different explanations. But a possible discrepancy between citizenship policy indices and naturalisation rates forces one exactly to face this type of discrepancies and to look for additional explanations. Mixing output and outcome indicators blurs, rather than ‘corrects’ the picture.

Helbling’s third claim that rejection rates are a better indicator for measuring policy effects than naturalisation rates is the most interesting part of his contribution and I am somewhat disappointed
that Helbling did not further elaborate this proposal. First, it would have been useful to discuss more extensively what these two indicators could possibly measure. My take on this is that both have potentials and pitfalls, but that eventually they measure different things. Naturalisation rates, i.e. the rate between the number of naturalisations and the total number of resident foreigners, measure just that: the percentage of naturalised foreigners per year. As discussed above, high naturalisation rates may say something about the general accessibility of citizenship, but it should be kept in mind that this ‘accessibility’ may be determined by many factors: material conditions, procedural conditions, implementation, contextual factors such as information campaigns, etc. Moreover, as Helbling rightly notes, even with a relatively accessible citizenship, both in terms of material and procedural conditions, people may simply not be very interested in it (in Helbling’s terms: demand may be low). The well-known discrepancy between citizenship policies and naturalisation rates is also nicely underlined by Figure 1 in David Reichel’s reply to Helbling’s comments.

Rejection rates, i.e. the percentage of submitted applications that is rejected, on the other hand, clearly say something about the relative difficulty of the acquisition procedure, but seem much less relevant with regard to capturing the overall accessibility of citizenship to the foreign resident population. Hence I am not fully convinced by Helbling’s statement that rejection rates depend ‘on the supply side only’, where he seems to mean with ‘supply’ the relative restrictiveness of citizenship policy. After all, the situation of a country with relatively strict material and procedural conditions (long period of legal residence, renunciation of citizenship of origin, integration requirements, high fee etcetera) and relatively low rejection rates, is not so difficult to imagine. One can think of Norway, which is not generally seen as a country with a very accessible citizenship policy (see e.g. its rather low MIPEX score), but which has a relatively low percentage of rejected applications (11% in the period 1988-2007, according to the statistics available). That is slightly lower than in Portugal (13%), much lower than in Denmark (42%) and marginally higher than rejection rates in the Netherlands (10%) or the UK (9%). Again, I do think that data on positive and negative naturalisation decisions are useful, in the sense of giving an indication of the difficulty of the procedure but they do not capture overall ‘policy effects’. Among the rates mentioned above, the Danish one clearly jumps out and arguably reflects the strongly discretionary character of the Danish procedure, where each naturalisation is still an act of parliament. This is a typical difference between the Danish procedure and procedures in most other European countries (except Belgium), but surely does not capture the overall difference between Danish citizenship policy and that in other countries. Materially, for example, Danish and Norwegian citizenship policy are arguably much more similar than such rates may indicate. Switzerland, the case studied extensively by Helbling, may also be exceptional in this sense due to specific local autonomy in the naturalisation procedure. In such a case, where perhaps a relatively high degree of procedural discretion in local naturalisation policies may be expected to cause strong differences between percentages of rejected and accepted applications across municipalities, rejection rates may be a very useful and interesting dependent variable in a study of local practices. But I would not go as far as to accept rejection rates as a universally better indicator for variation in citizenship policies.

From a more general perspective, going beyond Helbling’s brief comments, I would add some further remarks on naturalisation rates and rejection rates. These three remarks concern data availability and comparability.

First, apart from the problem that Reichel mentions that there is often a considerable time gap between applications and decisions, one additional problematic aspect of using rejection rates is that data on decisions is much less widely available than on actual naturalisations. National statistical offices and ministries in most countries (and Eurostat based on these data) publish yearly numbers of resident foreigners and of numbers of naturalisations, but obtaining data on decisions requires more investigative work and usually contact with specialised departments or immigration and naturalisation services – and even then success in obtaining these data is by no means guaranteed. For the
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Second, naturalisation rates are by no means unproblematic. One specific problem that Helbling does not mention is that in order to use them for country comparison we need to know what is captured by these data. For example, do they only cover ‘naturalisations’ or also alternative ways of acquiring citizenship for the foreign resident population, such as acquisition by declaration? In the Netherlands, for example, these acquisitions by declaration, such as by persons born in the Netherlands who can opt for Dutch citizenship at the age of 18, are normally included in the total number of acquisitions that is used, for example by Eurostat, when presenting comparative naturalisation rates. For this reason I find the term ‘naturalisation rates’ somewhat misleading and would rather use the term ‘citizenship transition rates’: the rates of transition from one legal category (foreign residents) to another (citizens). I hesitate, however, to go along with Reichel’s suggestion that a narrow ‘naturalisation’ definition would be better – after all, in many instances the use of a facilitated declaration procedure or even, as exceptionally in France for second generation immigrants, an automatic acquisition are quite clearly alternative ways of access to citizenship for a similar target group of resident foreigners. Ideally, indeed, as Reichel observes correctly, a cohort approach based on registration data would be a more precise indicator to study which percentages of similar groups of foreigners acquire citizenship across states, for example within ten years of arriving (first generation) or at a certain age (second generation).

In the absence of widely available cohort data, however, I would rather aim at attempting to further refine naturalisation rates, by improving the cross-national comparability of both citizenship acquisition data and resident foreign population data, for example by making sure that only adult citizenship acquisitions are included and only those by resident adult foreigners (e.g. excluding facilitated acquisition or reacquisition by emigrants).

I would not go as far, however, as Thomas Janoski does in Ironies of Citizenship (2010), to include automatic acquisition by virtue of birth in a country (ius soli) in these citizenship acquisition rates, by ‘adjusting’ the naturalisation rates for ius soli. First, certainly such rates that also include estimates of birthright acquisitions could no longer be called ‘naturalisation rates’, as Janoski continues to do. Secondly, although I appreciate Janoski’s creative attempt to deal with the problem of the comparability of naturalisation rates, I do think that his strategy is both flawed and unnecessary. It is flawed, because Janoski does not include the automatic attribution of citizenship to persons born in a country whose parents were also born in that country. In Europe such ‘double ius soli’ provisions currently exist in Belgium, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain. Surely, the adjustment for these citizenship acquisitions would be much more demanding. Other data than population, stock of foreign population and births would be needed and Janoski’s formula (Total Birth / Total Population) * Total Foreigners would no longer work. Yet, if adjustments are made for ius soli, it seems problematic not to adjust also for double ius soli.

More importantly, is such a complicated adjustment really necessary? Janoski’s main argument is that ‘[w]hen the consequences for jus soli rules are not taken into account, naturalisation rates clearly underestimate the increase in the number of people who obtain citizenship’ (Janoski 2010: 27). While Janoski does not elaborate this statement, it is undoubtedly true that citizenship acquisition by naturalisation or declaration are only part of the story of citizenship acquisition. Birthright acquisition actually is the default mechanism of attributing persons to states and naturalisation in a way is a ‘rescue mechanism’ to deal with the irregularities caused by migration. Yet, the effect of birthright policies on naturalisation rates needs to be qualified. The problem is that birthright policies have an effect on both the numerator and the denominator in the naturalisation rates. With regard to the denominator, the absence of ius soli provisions has an increasing effect on the size of the foreign population. This decreases naturalisation rates. However, with regard to the numerator, ius soli
provisions have a decreasing effect on the number of citizenship acquisitions, normally counted in naturalisation rates, which always refer to acquisitions after birth. After all, those persons who already obtain citizenship by virtue of birth in a country will not need to acquire citizenship by naturalisation. In other words: the absence of ius soli policies both leads to a larger foreigner population and to more naturalisations (or acquisitions by declaration).

Now, suppose that there are two countries, one with (A) and one without (B) ius soli. Both countries have a stock of foreign population of 0 in t0. From t1 onwards both A and B have an annual inflow of 1000 immigrants and an annual birth of 100 children to these immigrant parents. Suppose further that both countries have also similar naturalisation policies with access to citizenship after 10 years residence and that all immigrants, both adults and their children, acquire the citizenship of the respective countries when they are entitled to do so. These assumptions may not be plausible (ius soli countries tend to have greater immigration and also easier naturalisation) but they are necessary to see the impact of birthright policies on naturalisation rates. In country A those children born in the country would be citizens immediately and thus their birth does not lead to an increasing foreign population. Before t11 no immigrant is entitled to naturalisation and the naturalisation rate (or ‘citizenship transition rate’) is 0. In t11 and subsequent years the rate would be calculated as the number of immigrants residing for 10 years in country A, divided in by the stock of the foreign population: 1000/10000 or 10%. In B, until t11 the situation is the same: no one is entitled to citizenship acquisition. From t11 onwards, however, the number of immigrants residing for 10 years in B is the sum of the number of immigrants arriving 10 years ago (1000) and the number of immigrant children born 10 years ago (100). The denominator is also different because the stock of the foreign population is the sum of immigrants arriving in B 10 or less years ago (10000) and immigrant children born in B 10 or less years ago (1000). The rate is (1000+100)/(10000+1000) = 1100/11000 = 10%.

In other words, given these assumptions, and without adjusting for ius soli acquisition, naturalisation rates on average would be expected to be similar in ius soli countries and in non-ius soli countries, as a result of a combination of numerator (citizenship acquisitions) and denominator effects (stock of foreign population). Obviously, the hypothetical example formulated above is restricted to severe, and arguably implausible, ceteris paribus conditions. In particular, one might expect that not all persons born in country B acquire the citizenship of B at the age of 10 and that automatic access to citizenship iure soli is a much better guarantee than often discretionary naturalisation policies. Hence in a more realistic scenario, if anything, one might expect naturalisation rates to be higher in ius soli countries because of a smaller stock of foreign population.

The example also shows that the statement that without adjustment the naturalisation rates in countries with (some form of) ius soli acquisition ‘clearly understate[s] the increase in the number of people who obtain citizenship’, is indeed true (compare the stock of the foreign population in countries A and B at any point in time after t1), but perhaps less relevant than Janoski suggests. The fact that countries have different birthright citizenship policies is clearly relevant, and that this may affect citizenship acquisition and thus the stock of the foreign population is obvious. Yet that is no reason to introduce a specific adjustment of naturalisation rates for countries with ius soli policies. Naturalisation rates should be used to indicate just that what they measure: the periodical percentage of the stock of the foreign population that acquires citizenship of a specific country. The fact that the foreign population may be smaller in some countries may be caused by many things: migration inflow, emigration, birthright citizenship policies, material conditions for naturalisation, procedural requirements, implementation, information campaigns etcetera. In other words: birthright policies are part of the explanans, but not of the explanandum of naturalisation rates.

Reference
The of/for distinction

Jan Willem Duyvendak, Rogier van Reekum, Peter Scholten, Christophe Bertossi*

Our response to the discussion started by Marc Helbling will argue for a more thorough reflection on its central question: Which indicators are most useful for comparing citizenship policies? Indeed, what is most useful and what do we compare when we analyse citizenship policies? We agree that these two aspects should be dealt with more thoroughly: (1) How do we determine the usefulness of data in relation to specific kinds of questions? (2) What do we compare when we compare? Helbling has shown convincingly that we should distinguish between policy outputs and outcomes when choosing and sharpening our indicators and David Reichel rightly explained that specific indicators can work, provided the data are available, for specific questions. Yet, beyond these important methodological problems we think there is a programmatic discussion which should not be ignored or evaded, especially when looking for clear, methodological criteria. Both Helbling and Reichel point out that different kinds of questions demand different tools. Different sets of data allow one to answer different questions with more or less clarity. But more broadly than this, we should think about the kinds of research programs in which different questions have their place and what that means (1) for the usefulness of data; (2) for making comparisons.

It seems to us that beyond the difference between policy outputs and outcomes, there are two different research programs in the field of citizenship policy studies. Although they are different, they are often conflated and their difference remains undertheorised. On the one hand, we see sociology for policy. This program responds to the following question: Which effects do policies have in terms of what these policies were designed to do? So when Reichel states that “a correlation between policy outputs and outcomes has to be assumed, as otherwise citizenship policies would not have an effect on citizenship acquisitions”, he is speaking from within a sociology for policy. That is, the theoretical necessity of assuming this link is only necessary within a research program that has at its basis the goal of creating knowledge about what effects policies have in terms of what those policies were designed to do.

In general, the rationale of sociology for policy is to generate knowledge that can be rationally applied to policy development in order to reach more desirable results in terms of certain indicators. This includes, for example, the many government-associated research commissions (such as the British Parekh Commission, Dutch Blok Commission, French Stasi Commission and German Süssmuth Commission) that have been established in many European countries during the last decade to determine the success or failure of the respective national policies and based thereon to provide building blocks for future policies. More generally, researchers like Adrian Favell and Michael Bommes have argued that the strong policy orientation of scholars in the field of migration and citizenship studies has contributed to a preoccupation with very specifically national ideas of citizenship and integration, also described as ‘methodological nationalism.’

Often, and to our minds, inappropriately mixed with this first research program, we find sociology of policy. This second program answers to a question that is crucially different from the first: Why are specific policies adopted, how are these policies implemented and how are these policies re-arranged

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over time? This program raises completely different questions. At its heart is not the question of policy efficacy, but the political contestedness of policy arrangements and re-arrangements, the dilemmas that these policies create and the dynamics of these policies over time. It problematises national models of integration or citizenship policies, treating these models as a mode of discourse and taking them as objects of analysis rather than as starting points for analysis, as does a sociology for policy.

The book Contested Citizenship (Koopmans et al 2005) provides a good illustration of the way in which sociology of policy is often mixed with sociology for policy. At its core, the study is an analysis of contentious politics. Yet, every now and then, it switches to statements about the (comparative) efficacy of policies. The significance of policy effectiveness remains rather ambivalent, however, precisely because such statements figure in a study which is otherwise concerned with political process and struggle. More generally, we would argue that policy effects cannot play the same role in the two research programs, and neither can indicators measuring such effects.

Policy effects are concrete, comparable results to be explained within sociology for policy, notwithstanding the many methodological and practical puzzles and obstacles we are confronted with when trying to explain such effects, especially when explanation is built on comparisons. They are the dependent variable of a research program that seeks to create rationally applicable knowledge. These same effects are treated rather differently when studied from a sociology of policy perspective. Here, they are politically usable facts which can be employed at different points of discursive and institutional contention by the various actors. The result that the French do better or worse, or more or less than the Spanish in terms of a certain politically relevant aspect of citizenship policy as measured through a certain indicator is, in sociology of policy, a politically usable fact. The question then becomes how, when, by whom and to what effect it is used within the ongoing contention. Thus, we can be looking at the same indicators and yet see different things depending on the kind of research program we are committed to. There is not just a difference between policy outputs and outcomes, for which we might need different indicators. There is also a programmatic difference between overarching research questions, in relation to which the same indicator will play different roles.

The for/of distinction also has important consequences for the way in which we understand comparisons. In sociology for policy we compare the extent to which nation-states succeed or fail to achieve certain results. Now it might be either the governments of nation-states or communities of researchers who decide what those achievements are or should be. That is, the researcher may use as a basis for measurement what governments, more or less univocally, say they want to achieve. Alternatively, communities of researchers may decide amongst themselves what it actually is that they expect policies to do. In the latter case, researchers are not always explicit about why they focus on one thing rather than another. Still, the idea of comparing is relatively unambiguous within sociology for policy. Either governments or researchers can, more or less coherently, put forward certain dimensions, expressed through indicators, along which comparisons can be made. It might be technically difficult to do, but making such comparisons along fixed dimensions (that is, dimensions which are assumed to be the same for all the different nation-states) is conceptually sound. Building on these kinds of comparisons, the available variation among nation-states (e.g. EU member states) becomes a quasi-experimental, historical laboratory for policy learning: could what worked there, also work here?

Comparisons are completely different when one employs them for sociology of policy. Here the idea of fixed dimensions becomes problematic because a relevant dimension, for example a civic vs. ethnic distinction or continuum, may be relevant for different reasons in different institutional and discursive contexts. Not only may relevant aspects of citizenship policy be or become different across national settings, they are often also found to be quite different at various levels of the policy process within national settings and tend to change relatively quickly (Vermeulen 2006, Scholten 2011, Duyvendak et al. 2009; Bertossi 2009). Note that ‘different’ means here ‘embedded in a different politico-cultural and institutional environment’, not higher or lower scores on one and the same
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dimension. For example, whereas France has often been described as representative for the ‘civic’ colour-blind citizenship approach, empirical studies have revealed that many local policy practices actually do reveal an important ‘ethnic dimension’ (Bertossi & Duyvendak 2009). Similarly, the Dutch case is often described as exemplifying an ethnic ‘multicultural model’, which in many respects appears to be an ex-post reconstruction of Dutch policies rather than an accurate depiction of Dutch policies conducted over the past decades (Duyvendak & Scholten 2009).

This is also why wholesale labels for entire nation-states can be deceptive. A convergence towards assimilationist policies, as has been suggested lately (Joppke 2007), would still not mean that European countries are becoming more alike: from the perspective of sociology of policy it would still be important to distinguish what it is migrants are asked to assimilate to. The meaning of ius soli or ius sanguinis is not the same across national contexts. Dutch and French civi¬ness are also not the same and their differences yield divergent consequences, for naturalisation applicants as well as for the politics of citizenship (e.g. Maussen 2009; Bertossi & Duyvendak 2009).

The idea of comparing national models across fixed dimensions is, from the viewpoint of sociology of policy, problematic in two ways: (1) fixed dimensions mask the contextuality of political contention that is to be explained; (2) nation-states placed along dimensions cannot be treated as stable and undifferentiated entities – they are internally diverse and dynamic over time. In our perspective, the fact that national labels such as ethnic or civic are used widely does not mean that they are somehow valid. Rather, such labels have political usage (Bader 2007). They enable actors to refer to a bundle of policies as a concerted whole and thereby draw boundaries and differences, both between states and in time. Such labelling is part of the processes of political contention. Within sociology of policy national models are thus not irrelevant. It is crucial to analyse the performative effects of specific labels (Scholten 2011, Bowen 2007, Akan 2009, Bertossi & Duyvendak 2009).

But which tasks remain then for comparative research in sociology of policy as we have sketched it here? Whereas sociology for policy is prone to measure the relative distances between national regimes, we think comparisons can play a different role in sociology of policy. They are the only way to understand what is specific to each case and context. Comparisons allow us to critically juxtapose different situations and thus sharpen our understanding of each, exposing what would remain self-evident or unnoticed without a comparative approach. We think such juxtaposition, in the end, also enables policy learning: sociology of policy is good at highlighting particularities and vicissitudes of context and warning policy makers about the unintended consequences of all-too-instrumentalist perspectives.

Does the for/of distinction entail a split between quantitative and qualitative approaches? One could draw that conclusion from the above discussion, as sociology of policy would always emphasize the embeddedness of political processes and struggles. Yet, we argue that this would be a mistake. First of all, it is clear that sociology for policy cannot dispense with qualitative methodologies. Yes, the audiences of this kind of research often seem to have a preference for ‘hard’ evidence, but qualitative methods are crucial if policies are to achieve the desired results. Second, the fact that sociology of policy is not concerned with the naked quantities of certain indicators, but with their political usage and effects does not preclude the quantification of political acts. Again, Contested Citizenship provides a good example: in spite of our criticism of other aspects of this book, its attempt to measure political actions – claims – quantitatively is an effective way to sort out relative proportions of political activity. A recent study of the politics of integration in the Netherlands (Uitermark 2010) employs a very effective form of quantification by not only measuring the relative proportions of discursive interventions, but also by seeking out the various alliances and fault lines that emerge out of the interactions in public debates on integration and migration.

Summing up, we have argued that in order to be more precise about what is useful and what we are comparing we need to theorise the overarching research program in which we place our concrete
questions. Here, the distinction between sociology of and sociology for proves helpful. As we have argued, unwittingly or unsystematically mixing these two kinds of research leads to methodological messiness and conceptual sloppiness. If we keep unconsciously mixing them we will not be able to get clear about what we compare and what indicators are useful, no matter how good we are at solving methodological or practical puzzles. Although we do not want to discredit research for policy we do think sociology of policy should be the primary focus of academic research. It is our core responsibility as scholars to scrutinise and analyse policy discourses, practices and achievements; we should question what some consider as national citizenship regimes rather than reproduce them. We need to be able to problematise the concepts, practices and objectives of the people and processes we study. Taking them on board as if they themselves are not or cannot be contested simply will not do. Our primary responsibility should not be to address concerns of governments or policy advocates, but rather to create a deeper understanding of the actual processes taking place, from the arenas of parliaments and debate through the nexus of policy development to the practices of citizenship policies. An incessant focus on finding the “best” regime will not help us to play a constructive role in creating better realities.

References


What we need citizenship indicators for depends on who are “we”

Thomas Janoski*

I’d like to thank the four contributors to the citizenship indicators forum. For many years I felt like I was doing this type of data collection and research in a vacuum. Fortunately, things have changed due to your efforts. Based on the four discussion papers on the EUDO website, I’d like to discuss four issues related to citizenship: (1) naturalization rates, (2) citizenship indexes, (3) explanations of policy or integration, and (4) the of/for distinction or “whom do we want to influence?” question.

First, on the issue of naturalization, what is it exactly? Nationality law covers how strangers become citizens, but many would like to restrict ‘naturalization’ to a specific process. However, depending on the country, many people do not go through the standard process. How do orphans or foundlings become citizens? They do not go through a residence process with a test and so forth. In many but not all countries, spouses do not go through much of a naturalization process. Foreign members of the armed forces and refugees get a highly abbreviated naturalization process. Many states have/had special provisions for neighbouring countries (e.g., the Nordic countries gave their neighbours special privileges, and the British seem to give the Irish considerable leeway on citizenship). Technically, naturalization should apply only to adult immigrants coming from what is considered to be a foreign (not friendly neighbouring) country. Should one drop the spouses, adoptions, and special cases? This would cut the field of naturalizing citizens down quite a bit, but we would have people who went through the same “pure naturalization process.”

On the other hand, we could expand the range of ways foreigners can become citizens. One rarely encounters a discussion of naturalization that does not mention ius soli. Yet many would drop ius soli citizenship from the discussion of ‘foreigners becoming citizens.’ Maarten Vink finds good reasons for this. In the publication process I went round and round with reviewers of an AJS article about what to call the rate with ius soli adjustments. Many different names were suggested for this wider version of naturalization rates (“citizen acquisition rate” was one somewhat cumbersome suggestions), but for the article, we finally decided on “nationality rate.” In the book, the syndicate did not want an artificial name and asked me to use ‘naturalization rate.’ But in the end, I’m not sure the ‘nominal process of naming a rate’ is all that important. The rate is defined in the text and anyone who reads the paper or book knows what it includes and excludes. The important point to me is “what percentage of those foreigners who acquire citizenship” do you want to talk about? Only those who go through the “full process of naturalization” or “as many of those who acquire citizenship as possible?” In my mind, the explanation of the larger number of “foreigners who become citizens” is more important.

However, I do think that an article or book is needed on the methodology of naturalization rates. Such an article would lay out the different ways that naturalization rates can be computed and their methodological difficulties. It would discuss data limitations. For instance, it is difficult to get the birth rates of foreign populations, and nearly impossible to get the births of foreigners who themselves were born in the country. On this latter point, calculating double ius soli adjustments for a naturalization rate would be extremely difficult for a large number of countries. For some countries it is difficult to get basic naturalization data (e.g., Ireland and Italy). One country ignored numerous requests for naturalization data over a 12 year period (but data did appear from other sources). Such an article or

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book need not take a position on which measurement is preferable, but would instead outline the ways
that many different measures could be obtained, estimated, and/or calculated [1].

Second, in the “kickoff” Marc Helbling discusses new developments in the citizenship literature
concerning “citizenship indicators.” He asks whether we need so many, whether they measure the
same thing and whether they measure what they intend to measure. On the first question, he concludes
that they largely measure the same concepts. On the second question, he indicates that although they
largely measure the same concepts, we would do better to separate policy aspects from naturalization
rates. And on the third question, he indicates that most studies focus on naturalization rates as
outcomes, but he thinks we should focus on rejection rates.

Much of this issue depends upon the question: “Who is “we”?” For a meagre attempt at humour, it
reminds me of Tonto’s response to the Lone Ranger who says “We’re surrounded by hostile Indians.”
And Tonto, who is an Indian, responds: “What do you mean “we,” Kimosabe?” In the case of
citizenship, “we” could mean a EUDO “citizenship project” or the EU in general. Should EUDO,
OECD, EUROSTAT or the EU in general develop their own citizenship measures or citizenship
indicators? In the US, I always have to struggle with the “we” that centres around Hispanic
immigration and naturalization as the most important problem that “we” all should be concerned with.
Further, should the disciplines of political science or sociology have their own citizenship indicators?
Helbling has done some interesting comparisons of the different indicators and they often have
relatively high correlations. He is right that more rigorous indexing methods could be applied to these
measures. But the type of citizenship indicator will always vary according to the questions a researcher
asks and his/her audience (i.e., the “we”). For those who want a general indicator of the integration of
foreigners, naturalization and unemployment of immigrants would go together. For those who want to
explain naturalization rates, a more restricted measure that only looks at naturalization laws would fit.
For those who want to explain how foreigners become citizens, a measure that includes all types of
naturalization law including ius soli might do. And some only want to measure the law itself and not
correlate it (or assume its relation) to naturalization rates. Further, the data set may vary and this
influences what measure one might want to use. Some may look at the historical 18 OECD countries
(advanced industrialized countries) and others might want to look at the expanded EU with 33
countries (including the accession candidates and EEA countries but not the Americas or antipodes).
Others may increasingly include countries from Central and South America and Asia including Korea,
Singapore and Indonesia. These purposes are going to differ according to each research question. I’m
not a fan of trying to standardize this measure except where purposes are largely similar. Lawyers see
nationality law as infinitely more complex than social scientists do, but on the other hand, lawyers
intend to apply the law and not to explain long term changes in countries or regions. Any index like
this is an abstraction and selection of various aspects of law. A legal index may infinitely regress
toward particularity, but that generally doesn’t help much in the explanation of some outcome.
Concerning these questions, I agree with David Reichel that researchers will always need different
indicators for different research projects. And this may also vary according to the selection of
countries for the data set.

Third, more attention needs to be paid to the explanation of various naturalization rates and
policies. I say this even though I think scholarly attention toward data issues is severely undervalued. I
can’t help noting that some of the most important evaluators and analysts of data seem to leave

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One side note, Vink’s example of bias in calculating rates due to ius soli could be generalized to the overall naturalization
process. For instance: Two countries have 1,000 resident foreigners, and A has double the naturalization rate of B (200
vs. 100). After year one, with an additional immigration of 100 immigrants, country A would have a foreign population
of 900 (1000-200+100) and country B would have 1,000 (1000-100+100). If both countries A and B naturalized the same
number of people (say, 100) in the next year, then country A would have a higher naturalization rate than country B.
Thus, more open countries have a bias toward higher naturalization rates, and more closed countries have a bias toward
lower rates, mainly due to developments in their foreign populations.
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academia for private employment after completing their projects. Nonetheless, explanations are the ultimate result. We should also discuss a variety of research techniques that can be used to explain naturalization rates and laws. With regards to this I was a little puzzled by Reichel’s weak correlation of the MIPEX nationality index and naturalization rates. In my own research with a different combination of countries and years, the naturalization law index (I call it a barrier index) was the strongest and most significant factor in explaining naturalization rates. But despite left party power leading to more open naturalization index numbers, left party power had its own independent effect, which can be interpreted in a way analogous to Bloemraad’s work in the US and Canada (i.e., the other things that state does when it is controlled or influenced by the left). But different measurement approaches will yield different results.

Bringing more rigor to the explanation requires (1) measuring various regime types rather than simply naming them, (2) extending the time period under study and doing it as much as possible in a yearly manner, and (3) trying to combine explanatory analysis using individuals in survey research studies with more national oriented studies. A further challenge suggested by the cosmopolitanism literature might be to collect data by Provinces/Länder/départements and then see how much national policies do or do not explain. Helbling mentions a short test, which I would like to see more of, that uses structural equation models. While I was not convinced by his related discussion that rejection rates were more important than naturalization rates (I don’t deny that they can be quite insightful), the use of unobserved variables from multiple indicators using more components could be quite useful. For instance, LISREL or AMOS could construct an unobserved dependent variable consisting of (a) pure and narrow naturalization rates, (b) best estimates of ius soli births and double ius soli if they can be obtained, and (c) rejection rates. This also suggests an analogy from the strike literature in industrial relations. They look at the “shape” of strikes in terms of frequency (numbers), duration or length of strikes, and intensity in terms of how many people participate. In a similar way, a “shape of naturalization” measure could include the duration of naturalization processes (see Reichel’s discussion of duration), the number of people who are naturalized, and the number of people rejected. The immigration rate could also be included because higher naturalization rates may induce greater immigration. These are some suggestions that are not fully worked out. But they do point to some approaches to explanation and naturalization that could be helpful to research in the future. Finally, one can more fully use pooled time-series analysis for this type of data, while continually working on sensitivity analysis. I use this term to mean testing relationships while removing/including one country at a time to see what their impact is on the results one tends to find.

Fourth, Jan Willem Duyvendak, Rogier van Reekum, Peter Scholten and Christophe Bertossi discuss the of/for distinction. I take their statement that “the rationale of sociology for policy is to generate knowledge that can be rationally applied to policy development in order to reach more desirable results in terms of certain indicators” to mean that this approach takes a value position on the policy. Often this might mean more integration is desirable as opposed to segregation, or in the US, more immigration of Hispanics is desirable. Or it could be to expound upon the virtues of one country vs. another (e.g., methodological nationalism). The sociology of policy seems to be a more dispassionate explanation of the causes of policy with less regard for how these results might be perceived by policy-makers. I agree that mixing up these two approaches can result in some confusion. They conclude that the sociology of policy should be the focus of academic pursuits. Their point is well taken, but we will continue to see both approaches in different research projects, and also mixed up in other projects. In some ways this is unfortunate but inevitable. We just need to be careful in distinguishing the two approaches in the literature and at conferences.

In conclusion, I would like to encourage working out these first two data issues in articles or perhaps a conference.
From politics to impact: How citizenship really works

Thomas Huddleston*

Since 2006, I have headed the research for the Migrant Integration Policy Index, for its second edition and recent third edition. As a comparative political scientist, I am most interested in MIPEX’s main research goal. This public and regularly updated database compares policies within countries, between countries and regions, and over time (2007, 2010...). As the methodology goes global, MIPEX expanded from EU Member States to Norway, Switzerland, Canada, the United States, and soon Japan, Australia, and others. The profiles for each country and each area identify specific policies, changes, trends, and effects of European standards. You can download the raw data and comments. You can also “play with the data” by generating your own bar charts, maps, scatterplots, radar graphs, and changing the scores. Our latest findings on Access to Nationality are summarised in this EUDO-Citizenship News Item.

I understand Thomas Janoski’s enthusiasm to find this forum of other scholars measuring citizenship policies and outcomes; “For many years,” he writes, “I left I was doing this type of data collection and research in a vacuum.” In my experience, that disconnect is precisely the problem with today’s work on evaluating integration or citizenship.

In my post, I will argue that it is simplest and most efficient for researchers to (1) use EUDO-Citizenship data and MIPEX policy indicators for their research questions; (2) dig into the details of rich data-sources; and (3) collaborate to link sociology of/for policy.

1. Re-inventing the wheel?

Marc Helbling’s first recommendation is that keeping policy indicators as simple as possible will keep your research efficient and cost-effective. My advice to other young researchers is slightly different; keep it simple, if you really insist on doing it yourself. Otherwise, how can you alone accurately assess policies in different time-periods, especially if you cover different countries? Still, when your project is over this year, what indicators will I use for mine in one year or two?

I propose a simpler alternative: use MIPEX for your own research purposes. Its public database is designed for you. The main goal of the MIPEX policy indicators is and will continue to be measuring policies. This is not the goal of most other researchers, who attempt to analyse policy determinants or policy outcomes.

As David Reichel notes, researchers aim to answer different research questions, for which they need different indicators. Based on your unique research question, you may want to undertake secondary analysis, for which you may want to cut, edit, or weight certain MIPEX indicators. You may also want to code additional policies, for which you may want to add and code a few indicators. For instance, the EUDO-Citizenship data could be used to refine the MIPEX indicators or expand them beyond Access to Nationality. MIPEX will provide new data points in the future. I am interested how other projects could expand this resource for greater longitudinal analysis going back to 2004 (the MIPEX pilot year) and beyond to 2000, 1990, 1980... The SOM project is piloting this retroactive assessment for 7 countries. If you want more ideas, check out MIPEX IN USE, where I am posting how researchers incorporate the tool into their original research.

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These many uses of MIPEX are a more efficient, cost-effective, and credible alternative, especially when applying for competitive funding. Researchers can then focus limited resources and time on their original contribution to the literature. Marc’s reliability and consistency checks encourage us to better use each other’s work, rather than to keep re-inventing the wheel.

2. The beauty of comparison

MIPEX brings several other advantages to comparative quantitative researchers. First, comparative researchers contributed to designing the indicators, while the data was compiled and peer-reviewed by national independent legal experts in various areas. Most belong to comparative legal research networks on integration, anti-discrimination, education, and citizenship, including EUDO-Citizenship. Their scores not only reflect the official policy documents, but their comments add insight, case-law and administrative practice. These experts know how the law works, changes, and adapts to international standards and trends. The results are more rich and just as robust and consistent.

Second, researchers who collaborate or expand on their individual area of expertise can compare between the seven areas of integration covered in MIPEX. Citizenship researchers may be unaware of the links between Access to Nationality and other integration policies. One assumption bandied about the integration literature is that political rights for foreigners are a poor substitute for facilitated naturalisation. MIPEX 2007 and 2010 observes no such trade-off. In our book of secondary analysis, our co-authors found that the countries that open to immigrants a clear naturalisation path and citizenship entitlements for their children born in country tend to open many political opportunities before naturalisation. Jacqueline Gehring explored another positive correlation between access to nationality and protections against nationality discrimination. Between dimensions within the same strand, countries that allow dual nationality are more likely to allow short residence requirements and birthright citizenship. Between dimensions in different strands, the many high conditions (language, income, fees) that immigrants traditionally had to meet for naturalisation are increasingly also being imposed for long-term residence and family reunion.

In the seven areas covered, MIPEX’s 148 indicators offer greater detail than most indices and indicators that measure the same concepts. Like EUDO-Citizenship, MIPEX serves many audiences from “number-crunchers” to more qualitative researchers, lawyers, and diverse stakeholders. Compared to comparative quantitative researchers, they want more information in order to start policy evaluations, public debates, campaigns, or mutual learning exercises like peer reviews. When we invited several to EU-level consultations about our proposed policy indicators, we heard rarely “No, fewer” and often “Yes, and more!”

I argue that quantitative researchers also benefit from this level of refinement in the MIPEX indicators and scores. If your policy indicators are two-options questions, you will miss the massive middle where most policy is made. The answer is rarely Yes/No or Either/Or. Look no further than the EUDO-Citizenship Acquisitions database to appreciate all the exceptions and exemptions, the conditions, combinations, and compromises. I have a running debate with a colleague about whether immigration and citizenship law IS complicated because it deals with human beings, or is MADE complicated because it deals with “foreigners.” Whoever wins that free beer, we agree that is indeed complicated. Any indicator must live with this complexity, so ours in MIPEX uses a three-options format that better captures the full range of policy options.

If your policy indicators stay simple, they may miss slow-moving changes and trends. You will obtain country rankings and distributions that may only capture major reforms. Between the limited period of 2007 and 2010, MIPEX found that the average EU country improved overall just 1-out-of-100 points. Few countries were able to invest in such reforms, especially in sensitive areas as Political Participation (only Greece) or Access to Nationality (Greece, Luxembourg, Slovakia, United
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Kingdom). Still, MIPEX registered small-scale shifts on several citizenship indicators in eight additional countries, as evidenced by this scatterplot.

Simpler indices would miss these changes. They may reflect major debates in the media and divisions in politics, since much policy capital can be spent on making minor changes. Small signals may likewise have significant effects on procedures and peoples’ attitudes and behaviours.

3. Policy as outcome and input

Duyvendak et al’s very relevant distinction between sociology of/for policy should, in my opinion, encourage us to better link the two together in research. I regularly come across both types, since sociology of/for integration policy intersect around MIPEX. For sociology of policy, MIPEX is the outcome. Researchers are often political sociologists and scientists who ask what factors influence how bills become laws. These political factors are the inputs that create outputs (new laws), which change the MIPEX score. For sociology for policy, MIPEX is an input. These sociologists focus on integration processes, where laws are but one factor among many. For example, MIPEX Access to Nationality scores represent one type of policy input that affects application, rejection, acquisition rates and ultimately the share of foreigners who acquired citizenship.

I argue that researchers should analyse MIPEX as both an outcome and an input, since citizenship laws are developed as part of the policy loop. Sociologists of policy who want to analyse the political factors driving policy change need to understand what are the measured vs. perceived effects of a policy. Integration—and, to some extent, access to nationality—is increasingly submitted to the logic of “evidence-based policymaking.” Policymakers choose to use and/or misuse data in order to justify their proposed changes. These contested evaluations and statistics make up today’s “politics of numbers” in immigration debates. Similarly, sociologists for policy who want to evaluate the implementation and outcomes of the policy need to understand what are the political factors. Political parties and discourse are increasingly important factors, as citizenship is politicised and frequently reformed. These factors can change how the current policy is implemented and used, even if the legislator ultimately does not change the letter of the law. They change other inputs like the allocation of funding and staff. They can affect administrative interpretation and rejection rates in Europe’s discretionary naturalisation procedures, especially where decisions are made by civil servants without judicial oversight or by local/regional authorities, parliaments and presidents. They can even affect application rates. Most people “learn” about policies through the public discourse, which can inform or misinform—encourage or discourage.

Conclusion

All these links call for collaboration. If everyone keeps creating and scoring their own indicators in isolation, then we will miss all the links between how citizenship policies are formulated, implemented, and affecting people’s lives. Where I sit between research and policymaking, I see many intersecting questions that have and will bring together citizenship lawyers, practitioners, political scientists and those sociologists of/for policy:

a) What are the opportunities and obstacles to reform in different national contexts?
b) What are the links between countries’ citizenship policies and their integration policies?
c) How can the implementation of citizenship policies be measured?
d) Why are immigrants naturalising? Why are they not?
e) To what extent are policies responsible for high/low/changing acquisition rates? Do changes to policy change these rates?
f) How much do different policies and factors (including political factors) affect citizenship acquisition, from individual’s characteristics to conditions in their country of residence and origin?

g) How does becoming a citizen improve an immigrant’s socioeconomic status, political participation, representation or sense of belonging?

As part of a joined-up approach, we need together to develop and analyse indicators of policy, politics, discourse, implementation, outcomes, and impact. Many of you are part of this debate: Maarten Vink on explaining citizenship status, David Reichel on measuring the determinants and consequences of citizenship acquisition, Ines Michalowski on citizenship tests, Marc Helbling on public debates, Pieter Bevelander and Don DeVoretz on the economics of citizenship. I hope to follow and contribute to greater collaboration on the state of law, practice and outcomes in a crucial area of immigrant integration.
On the relevance of comprehensive comparative analyses at the subnational level

Anita Manatschal*

The citizenship forum kicked off by Marc Helbling brings up very interesting and important aspects which should be considered by current analyses on citizenship and related policies. Focusing on subnational variations of integration policy, I will pick up some of the aspects raised in the preceding comments. Essentially, I will defend two arguments: first, I claim that we should apply a constant conceptual framework (e.g. policy indicators) when analyzing the same aspects at different analytical levels (i.e. national, regional, local). Second, while I consider Duyvendak et al.’s distinction between sociology of/for policy necessary and important, I tend to agree with Huddleston who points to the relevance of analyzing both, as I think that occasionally such combined research approaches are more revealing.

In his comment Janoski suggests to extend the analytical scope from the national to the subnational level. I strongly agree with this suggestion for three reasons: empirically, subnational variations of integration policy remain largely neglected, although they are particularly pronounced in federal immigrant states such as the United States, Canada, Austria, Germany, or Switzerland (cf. Akgün and Tränhardt, 2001). Methodologically, the subnational comparative level provides clear analytical benefits, as it offers the best approximation to a most similar cases setting, whereas the same degree of comparability is barely reachable at the international comparative level. Third, from an epistemological perspective leading comparativist Lijphard (1971) has demanded for a long time that empirical results from the international level should be validated at the subnational comparative level. It becomes clear that if we are interested in validating research results at the subnational level, we would need to keep the conceptual framework constant. Thus, when shifting the analytical level while following the same research purpose, the question is not primarily which indicator of citizenship or integration policy to choose, but that this indicator should be kept constant at different analytical levels.

As this is the purpose of my present research project, I transferred an internationally established instrument of integration policy to Switzerland’s subnational, cantonal level. I drew on the conceptual framework elaborated by Koopmans et al. (Koopmans, 2010, Koopmans, et al., 2005), which covers in large parts similar components as the MIPEX. The components measured at the cantonal level include access to the labour market, access to nationality, political participation, anti-discrimination, family reunion, the cultural requirements for naturalisation and religious rights. For a detailed and critical discussion of this transfer see Manatschal (forthcoming). The figure below illustrates the aggregated values (additive index based on components mentioned above) for the 26 cantonal integration policies, whereas values below zero stand for restrictive policies, and values above zero represent liberal integration policies. A look at the figure clarifies that the common characterization of Switzerland as an assimilationist country neglects a considerable subnational variety which is hidden behind this uniform national classification.

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In a second step, I will explain why I consider it potentially more illuminating to develop comprehensive research projects accounting for both, “sociology for and of policy”, to use the terminology of Duyvendak et al., as opposed to isolated research projects focusing on only one aspect. I agree with Duyvendak et al. that the distinction between sociology of policy versus sociology for policy constitutes an important contribution to the theorisation of two distinct overall research programmes. I furthermore agree with the point made by the authors (also raised by Janoski) that researchers should be careful not to mix the two research programmes unconsciously.

However, similar to Huddleston, I assume that the two research programmes can be very well combined in one and the same comprehensive research design, provided the combination is done consciously and with enough analytical and methodological rigour, meaning that the two research programmes are clearly classified as distinct analytical parts of an overall research project. Whereas Hellbling, Reichel and Vink use the notion of “output” and “outcome” to refer to this distinction, Huddleston suggests to refer to policy as “outcome” and “input” respectively. As for my quantitative comparative analyses, I apply an even simpler terminology and speak of integration policy as “dependent” (sociology of policy) or “independent variable” (sociology for policy) respectively. While I think it is important that researchers take seriously Duyvendak et al.’s warning (also raised by Favell (2001)) that research on citizenship should not be dictated by governments or policy advocates, I do agree with Huddleston that research on citizenship is potentially most revealing if we consider all the aspects of the policy cycle, including the evolution of policies, politics, discourse, implementation, outcomes, and impact.

I will illustrate this point by coming back to my cantonal data on integration policy. Comparative cross-sectional regression analyses revealed that the attitude of the cantonal population towards immigrants, which is influenced by the cultural-linguistic French- or German-speaking heritage of a canton, is clearly related to cantonal integration policies (Manatschal, forthcoming). This pattern is already discernible in the univariate figure above: five of overall six predominantly French-speaking cantons (JU, NE, GE, VD, FR) account for the most liberal cantonal integration policy indices. One might now assume that cantonal public attitudes towards immigrants, as they are for instance expressed in national or cantonal votes on citizenship attribution, influence cantonal formulations of integration policy. However, one could argue that the causality works also in the other direction, i.e. that cantonal policies shape public attitudes on immigrants. While these are not policy outcomes regarding the immigrant population, at which such policies are addressed (and which seem to be in the focus of Duyvendak et al.’s concept of sociology for policy), they are nevertheless policy outcomes of
On the relevance of comprehensive comparative analyses at the subnational level

care when interested in the dynamics of policies. Even more plausibly, it might be argued that the relationship between attitudes and citizenship or integration regimes is mutually reinforcing (cf. Weldon, 2006). It becomes clear that the possibility of such a mutual relationship cannot be accounted for adequately if we would consider integration policy only as an outcome, or as an input. A study of such complex causalities requires a comprehensive analysis which keeps the whole policy cycle in mind.

Abbreviations of Swiss cantons

AG= Argovia; AI = Appenzell Inner Rhodes; AR = Appenzell Outer Rhodes, BE = Berne; BL = Basel-Country; BS = Basel-City; FR = Fribourg; GE = Geneva; GL = Glarus; GR = Grisons; JU = Jura; LU = Lucerne; NE = Neuchâtel; NW = Nidwald; OW Obwald; SG = St. Gall; SH = Schaffhausen; SO = Solothurn; SZ = Schwyz; TG = Thurgovia; TI = Ticino; UR = Uri; VD = Vaud; VS = Valais; ZG = Zug; ZH = Zürich

References


Concluding remarks

Marc Helbling *

The starting point of this forum debate was the recent construction boom of citizenship indicators. While most of us were glad to see that citizenship research has entered a new stage, some found it rather troublesome that these indicators have been constructed mostly independently from each other. It has hardly ever been specified in these projects why new indicators have been built instead of using existing ones or why they have been built differently. Why, for example, are sometimes only eight items retained and sometimes over a 100 to build an index? Why do some indicators only cover nationality laws and others also include integration regulations?

My motivation to start this debate was not necessarily to reduce the number of indicators, to call for better ones or to find out which indicators were more valid than others (despite my provocative title). Rather, I felt an urge to start a more systematic discussion about the use of indicators. If there is one point, on which all contributors agree, it is the following one: The usefulness of an indicator can only be evaluated in the light of a specific research question. Unfortunately, many research projects that have employed citizenship indicators have not always been very clear on this aspect and have not always told us in the light of which research question the indicators have been built. To select the most appropriate indicator we, however, need to know what exactly they measure. As Janoski and Huddleston suggest, one step towards such a clarification is bringing people together who work on the same topic. In that regard this forum debate has been a clear success and hopefully constitutes the point of departure for further discussions.

I started off this debate with making three differentiations: between policy outputs and outcomes, naturalisation and rejection rates as well as simple and more complex indicators. Regarding the last aspect I wondered whether it might be more efficient to stick to simple indicators if it turns out that they are correlated highly with more sophisticated indexes. Just to avoid any misunderstandings: even if this is the case, this does not put in question the utility of large and detailed datasets such as the EUDO citizenship project. As Vink rightly points out, such a dataset provides the basis for a great many research projects and allows for post-coding aggregation by different end-users. However, if our primary aim is to build a specific indicator, a more parsimonious data collection might be the way to go. Anyway, more empirical research is needed to know whether simple and more complex indicators lead to the same results or not. In their discussions of democracy indices Elkins (2000) and Coppedge and Gerring (2011: 249) for example argue that contrary to simple dichotomous indicators continuous and more complex ones have superior validity and reliability and are more precise as they are more sensitive to gradations.

Going beyond my differentiations, the contributors to this debate raised further crucial ones: Janoski, Reichel and Vink discussed different ways to conceptualize naturalisation rates. While their meaning seems to be quite clear at first sight, the discussion showed that they can be conceptualised in very different ways. All three of them also challenged my proposition to use rejection rate as an alternative outcome measurement. I agree with Vink that it is much more difficult to get data on rejection than on naturalisation rates. They are hardly ever collected by government institutions. In my study I had to collect them myself for each Swiss municipality in my sample (Helbling 2008). However, this should not prevent us from discussing the potential advantages if, in an ideal world, we disposed of all data we needed.

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Of course, it makes hardly any sense, as Reichel points out, to compare the number of rejections with the number of submitted applications of the same year. Since naturalisation procedures always take some time, in my own study I have taken the average values across a certain time period. For Vink, rejection rates tell us something about the relative difficulty of the acquisition procedure, but not necessarily anything about the overall accessibility of citizenship to the foreign resident population. This is an important point, to which I did not pay enough attention in my own research. I think that it is indeed the case that rejection rates do not only reflect the policies themselves but also their implementation. This however only strengthens my argument according to which rejection rates are much closer to naturalisation policies (and their implementation). In other words, policy effects are better measured with rejection than with naturalisation rates. The latter are also very much influenced by migration flows and immigration policies that control the influx of immigrants and in the end also the composition of potential candidates for citizenship acquisition.

Duyvendak et al. made a further distinction between sociology for and sociology of policies and thus between policies and their effects, on the one hand, and the way policies came into being and how they are framed by politicians, on the other hand. Simplifying this differentiation a lot, it urges us to use citizenship indicators as both independent and dependent variables and to look at both causes and consequences (see also Manatschal’s contribution). As much as I agree that we should investigate both aspects, I disagree that the sociology of policies is more important for social science research than the sociology for policy as Duyvendak et al. claim. I think that there is a misunderstanding of what others and I understand by the usefulness or efficacy of policy indicators. It is of course possible to evaluate the effects of policies in the light of political aims or normative expectations. Moreover, there is indeed sometimes a danger that researchers reproduce politicians’ discourses. You can however evaluate the effects of policies independently of political expectations by simply comparing the outcomes of different policies. At last, disposing of policy indicators for a large number of countries allows us to investigate whether the same or similar policies lead to the same outcomes or not.

Finally, using similar terms like for example “multiculturalism” does not mean that researchers adhere to the normative expectations politicians have. I, for example, disagree with Brubaker (2003) who prefers not to use the term ‘nation’ as this, according to him, essentialises national entities. It is a much better idea to clearly define the terms we use and to make a clear difference between the analysis of categories and categories of analysis (Bourdieu). On the one hand, when a politician speaks of a multicultural citizenship model he or she most probably refers to certain norms and specific policies. On the other hand, more and more social scientists understand by such a notion a heuristic tool that helps them to understand, for example, how close a concrete policy comes to a certain ideal type. Moreover, when a politician speaks of policy efficiency he or she most probably refers to the link between policy outcomes and their original intentions. Researchers are however rather interested in the relationship between policy regulations and the outcomes. Does a citizenship law that requires more criteria to be fulfilled lead to lower naturalisation and higher rejection rates?

While differentiating policy outputs from outcomes already points to two crucial stages of a policy process, Huddleston and Manatschal have urged us to look at the entire policy cycle by introducing a difference between public discourse, policies, their implementation and outcome. Manatschal’s work on regional integration regimes is not primarily about policy implementation, but it reveals how heterogeneous such policies can be within the same nation-state. As Czaika and de Haas (2011) have revealed for immigration policies and I have shown for citizenship policies (Helbling 2011), there are important gaps between the different phases of a policy process. Public debates do not necessarily result in the claimed policies, which in turn might be implemented in various ways and thus result in diverging policy outcomes. It thus matters a lot which indicators we use depending on which part of a policy cycle we like to investigate.

The low correlation between indicators measuring different phases of a policy cycle also puts in question the idea of citizenship models (not as heuristic tools but as an empirical fact). Comparing
different indicators the obvious question is whether we find the same dominant ideologies in different areas within a country. Is it plausible to assume that a certain understanding of citizenship is inscribed in a country as such and affects integration and naturalisation policies, public debates and implementation processes in the same way? This question relates to the literature on citizenship models and the idea that they constitute broader societal phenomena that can also be observed beyond formal and legal regulations (see Helbling 2010).

Speaking of cultural idioms, Brubaker’s (1992) argument about the difference between France and Germany implies that citizenship models constitute more than formal regulations and also reflect ways of thinking and talking about nationhood. In other words, the way cultural boundaries of a nation are drawn in national regulations reflects some deeper societal understanding of what the nation is. If this were the case, we would observe these cultural idioms in different arenas and high correlations between the various indicators. Even if we concede that models change over time we should still observe high inter-correlations as for example new ideas are discussed in public debates that are then translated into new policies and implemented accordingly. In other words, if there were such strong cultural idioms, we would not need to care that much about which indicators we use for our analyses as they would all measure the same theoretical constructs.

However, there are at least some hints that this is not at all the case. It makes a difference, for example, whether an indicator includes nationality laws or cultural rights that are attributed to immigrants and whether we investigate public debates on immigration issues or concrete policy outputs (Helbling 2011). It thus might be that the concept of models is too simplistic as it ignores variation within a country (Bader 2007: 875-877). But this is only so if we understand by models broader societal phenomena. Even if we do not observe specific patterns between national political debates, it might still be that the policies follow some national traditions. In the end, both long term and short-term factors can have an effect on policies.

In my kick-off contribution I have already discussed how the studies by Helbling (2008), Howard (2009), Janoski (2010), Koopmans et al. 2011) show that political parties and their rather short-term mobilisation play an important role. However, all of them also investigate and find long-term effects. Both Howard (2009) and Janoski (2010) investigate the impact of colonialism on naturalisation policies and rates, respectively. They argue and show that countries that have had a long colonisation experience were early on confronted with the problem of how to incorporate natives/immigrants and thus developed liberal naturalisation regimes. Howard (2009) develops a second long-term argument and shows that early democratising countries developed a civic national identity tied to liberal values. Koopmans et al. (2011) also develop a long-term argument even if empirically they do not go back as far as Howard and Janoski. In a Brubakerian perspective and against a widely held opinion they show that no convergence of citizenship policies occurred in Western Europe over the last decades. On the contrary, it appears in their analysis that the policies at the end of the 2000s are best explained with the situation in 1980. In my own work I show that the local understanding of citizenship measured by means of voting results in Swiss municipalities over two decades has an important impact on rejection rates (Helbling 2008). It thus appears that both short and long-term factors are relevant to understand citizenship policies and their outcome.

Coming to such conclusions was only possible by means of indicators. Being aware of all the simplifications a quantification of complex phenomena such as citizenship entails, they still allow us to compare a large variety of cases and issues and test widely held arguments more systematically. We need, however, to be careful when we construct them and be explicit about our aims and research questions; otherwise such indicators are not very useful.
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